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THE
BOURBONS OF NAPLES,
WITH A
NEAPOLITAN'S REFLECTIONS.

113. BOURBON OF NAPLES. "Observations on a Pamphlet entitled The Bourbons of Naples; to which are added, The Reflections of a Neapolitan. Translated from the French." 1814, 73pp. Unbound.

OBSERVATIONS

ON

A PAMPHLET,

ENTITLED

THE

BOURBONS OF NAPLES;

TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

THE

REFLECTIONS OF A NEAPOLITAN.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR JAMES RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY.

1814.

THE HISTORY OF THE

REIGN OF

CHARLES THE FIRST

BY

C. WOOD, Printer,
Peppin's Court, Fleet Street.

OBSERVATIONS
ON
A PAMPHLET,
&c. &c. &c.

THE Pamphlet, which we have undertaken to examine, is one of the most extraordinary, that has ever been produced; and the very circumstances related in it will add considerably to the surprise, which the work itself ought naturally to excite. That the servile instruments of the tyranny of Bonaparte may have composed relations, bulletins, and official or unofficial pamphlets, in order to give a false signification to the text of treaties, and recommend their infraction, by giving a colour to perjury, disloyalty, and ingratitude, is a conduct that the whole world expected, and could look for no other; but it is scarcely credible, that recourse has been had to such means, that such

principles are avowed, under the reign of a just, wise, and generous king; under the dominion of a prince, who, through love to his people, and from a perfect knowledge of the present state of Europe, as well as from the necessity of paying attention to the various active and powerful interests, that have arisen in the course of twenty-five years of successive revolutions, has made the most magnanimous sacrifice of his remembrance of past events, submitting his feelings and affections to all that could be required of him from the most enlightened prudence, or from the most elevated degree of morality. What! is it under Louis XVIII, a monarch on whom history, in admiring his wisdom, will specially confer the title of a king, and an honest man, that there are those who dare to preach a crusade against a prince, who, if he owes his throne to the revolution and to Bonaparte, has not the less co-operated in terminating this revolution, and in delivering Europe, in concert with the powerful allies; and this according to the proper confession of those allies, and in consequence of a formal treaty with one of the most eminent of them; a treaty virtually ratified by all the others, since they have derived the most signal advantages by

this important co-operation: and the motives for this crusade are founded on maxims, which are the destruction of the law of nations, and of all public and private morality, at the same time, that, in the present conjuncture, they tend to bring again in question, all that now confirms the repose and tranquillity of individuals, of nations, and of sovereigns. For — we will clearly prove it — if these maxims were admitted, they would not only annihilate whatsoever guarantee has been given to those, who, in some manner or other, have taken a share in all the revolutions, that, for five and twenty years past, have agitated the different nations of Europe — and this class is so numerous, that considerable danger might arise from the troubles that would result from its own alarms; they would, moreover, invalidate the titles on which the actual possessions of several sovereigns are founded, who have aggrandized themselves during the revolution. The duke of Wurtemberg and the elector of Bavaria are kings of Wurtemberg and Bavaria, by the same title, that Joachim the First is king of Naples. The emperor of Austria has no other right to Venice: Maria Louisa has no other to Parma: the king

of Sardinia cannot alledge any other to Genoa : the king of Prussia will not possess Mentz and Luxembourgh, the prince of Orange the Netherlands, nor the emperor Alexander Poland, on any other ground. To advance, that their dynasties are of a more ancient date, changes nothing in their relations with the inhabitants, who are not less strangers to them than the Neapolitans were formerly to the prince, who now governs them. To deprive this prince of his throne is to question all the arrangements, that have been made in Europe, during the last twenty-five years, and to stamp with the seal of nullity, or, at least, with uncertainty, all that the congress are going to regulate. And this is not a danger of simple speculation ; this doubt and these uncertainties are not trifles, at a moment, when the fears of all are awakened, when the courage of all is prone to war, when risks and dangers are become habitual and common to an immense mass of the population in every country, and when those that govern, be they who they may, have a most powerful interest in preventing any question from being revived, in obliterating all ideas that might refer to the origin of their rights and titles of possession,

and, finally, in not presenting to the discontented either pretexts, or a chief, or a standard of reunion.

We conceive, then, that we are rendering a service to Europe, and to the kings themselves to whom these destinies are referred, in refuting the pamphlet written against the prince, who reigns at Naples. We shall demonstrate, that his confirmation on that throne is the immediate means of establishing peace and tranquillity, and will be the confirmation of all that is, and of all that will be: but that any attempt to deprive him of his kingdom, by reducing him to the necessity of embracing all the means that offer of defending himself, might rekindle a vast flame; and, at all events, whatever might be the result, even at a distant period, would force the different powers to keep up a state of warfare, contrary to the wishes of their people, to the re-establishment of their finances, and to that tranquillity and repose, which are of such vital importance to the future prosperity of their subjects, and—we dare say more—even to the very safety of their thrones.

We will not follow the author in his exposition of the conduct of the ancient sovereigns of Naples, down to the period when the chance of

war deprived them of their continental possessions. The persons of kings are sacred, and it is incumbent on every one to abstain from any accusation against them. If it is intended to question their prerogative in every circumstance of their conduct, no monarchy can any longer exist. And this principle extends itself to all those, who, by consent of the European powers, and in consequence of formal treaties, are at this day seated on their thrones. If this principle be not admitted, there will never be an end to protesting. Some will compare, to the Bourbons of France, the descendants of Clovis, still existing; others, the king of Rome; and, if Ferdinand should not recognise the force of treaties, founded on conquest, the name of Corradino would soon recal to our minds the fact, that the house of Anjou, allied to the Bourbons, was established on the scaffold of a prince then a prisoner, without the means of defending himself, and legitimate heir to the sceptre, which was ravished from him, together with his life.

Nor shall we examine the apology the author advances in favour of the king of Sicily, notwithstanding that his recital even indicates, at least, a fluctuating conduct. Ferdinand signed, says he, in 1798, a peace, that his heart dis-

avowed. Is not this reasoning of a nature to destroy all confidence in treaties? When the inhabitants of the city of Naples defended themselves during three days in the streets, Ferdinand had concluded an armistice. When cardinal Ruffo raised the standard against the French, Ferdinand made peace with them, and agreed to maintain a French army in his kingdom, against his own subjects. When the war was kindled again between France and Austria, in 1805, Ferdinand concluded a treaty of neutrality: he broke it, it is true, two months afterwards. But we observe, once more, that we will not pronounce an opinion on these different actions; let it be permitted us, however, to compare to this conduct, that of Louis XVIII. During the space of twenty years of misfortunes, which Providence has suffered him to experience, that he might unfold his calm and magnanimous character, is there one single act of similar evasion? One single act of prevarication? One act of velleity towards the oppressor of Europe? Ferdinand has acknowledged the power of Bonaparte, and has thus deprived himself of the most powerful reason for authorizing a protest. Louis XVIII has

preserved all his rights, because he ever refused to commute them.

Thus, as he possessed true courage, he has always been sincere, and his conduct has been a mixture of nobleness and loyalty; and, were we to carry the comparison still farther, what might we not say? During the short re-establishment of Ferdinand, over his ancient subjects, what vengeance did he not exercise? What traces of blood marked every step of his government, during this short administration? How many victims does not all Italy deplore to this day? And what victims!—Men the most estimable and irreproachable—the most celebrated in the republic of letters, in administration, in the sciences, and in the arts! On the contrary, Where are the victims that Louis XVIII has cut off? Where are the tears which he has caused to be shed? Having received the most cruel outrage, and wounded in his most tender affections, he has shown himself the protecting angel of France; and, similar to Providence, has made himself known but by the beneficence of his heart.

But away with past events. We have said enough to prove, that the reasons alledged by the author, in favour of the ancient dynasty,

are far from successful. An apparent submission, secret efforts, impotent stratagems, a contradictory conduct, which only tended to compromise the rights of his people; acts of cruel revenge, committed with such haste, as if he had a foreboding, that the power of revenging himself would be short,—these are not sufficient titles, to engage all Europe to expose its safety afresh, to support them against a number of formal and sacred treaties, renewed again and again, in the course of nine years, by the different powers; treaties, which, without any necessity of judging the conduct of Ferdinand, are sufficient to annul all his pretensions; for, if we look upon these pretensions to be legitimate, we must consider as illegitimate all that the sovereigns of Europe have done during the space of nine years.

Can this proposition be sustained? Dare any one say, in congress, to all the powers there united together, that they have betrayed their trusts, that they have been wanting in what was due to their dignity? How would such language be received by the king of Prussia, who never swerves from his word, and by the emperor of Austria, whose daughter cannot cease to be the sister-in-law to Joachim I, and by

the magnanimous Alexander, who would be the most enlightened of men, in private, if Providence had not placed him in the rank of monarchs? All the injurious expressions accumulated on Joachim I, fall upon those, who have entered into treaties with him, who have recognised him, who have presented him with decorations of honour, and who have received others from him in exchange. Let it not be affirmed, that it has been the same with Bonaparte. He attacked the vital interests of every power; he has deservedly drawn upon himself, that all should unite in his downfall. The king of Naples has seconded the allies in the achievement of this honourable enterprise, and his co-operation has given a redoubled value to prior treaties.

It may be remarked, that, precisely at this time, there is a circumstance, in the political affairs of Europe, which singularly weakens the apology written in favour of Ferdinand IV. The king of Saxony loses his states. Now, his conduct varies in nothing from that of Ferdinand. In analogous circumstances he made use of subterfuge in his negotiations, he abandoned his people, he was pusillanimous, and his weakness was nearly allied to falseness. If the con-

duct of Ferdinand is irreproachable, that of the king of Saxony is equally so; and the allied powers, who are for dividing his states, in endeavouring to restore Ferdinand to the throne, would accuse themselves of a contradictory conduct, give to all their measures the most repugnant appearance of injustice, and would leave, in the minds of the whole world, the most fatal and never to be effaced impressions. In punishing the king of Saxony; the allied powers have pronounced sentence against Ferdinand, with this difference, that the latter preserves one kingdom, whilst the king of Saxony has none to preserve.

But, say they, the co-operation of Joachim I, in the war against Bonaparte, was tardy and even doubtful. The author speaks, in an affirmative tone, of negotiations, which are yet covered with a veil. Without entering into an examination of his assertions, which he does not support by any proofs, we will take upon us to say, that the adhesion of the king of Naples to the coalition was striking a decided blow against Bonaparte in Italy, where his arms had not received the smallest check. It was not till then, that the viceroy was forced to quit the offensive, and to make his retreat. This is

demonstrated by all the official papers of the times and by the bitter complaints of that prince against the king of Naples; a more evident demonstration of this, is the treaty concluded with the court of Vienna, a treaty of alliance and guarantee, under the date of the 11th of January, 1814. Certainly, it must be manifest to every impartial person, that if, instead of seconding the allies, the king of Naples had proclaimed himself the defender of Italy, even in dissolving the ties that connected him with Bonaparte, he would have introduced into the affairs of Europe, a new element, which must have disconcerted all the plans of the coalition; and we will add, that, even now, though circumstances are changed, if Joachim I should think himself deceived, this resource is still left for him, perhaps with a less favourable chance of success, but certainly much preferable to that of allowing himself to be the passive victim of a perfidious conduct, which he could neither suspect nor foresee.

This treaty with Austria considerably embarrasses the author, whom we are refuting. In order to weaken its effect, he is continually falling into palpable contradictions. On the one side, he cannot help accusing Austria, by endea-

vouring to show, that this treaty causes the astonishment and the scandal of all Europe. Again, he wishes to diminish the services rendered by the king of Naples, by saying, that the irremediable disasters of Leipsig had already reduced the affairs of France to a desperate state; and, soon after, he confesses, that, though the armies of the allies had penetrated into France, the success of the invasion was not assured. He relates, without producing any proof, and allowing at the same time that it is a vague rumour, that, even after the signing of this treaty, the king of Naples wished to negotiate with Bonaparte; and he takes advantage of this supposition, to break forth in invectives, forgetting that these invectives fall with much greater force on all the allied powers, who, down to the 15th of March, continued to treat with Bonaparte; and even held in doubtful uncertainty the deliverance of Europe, by the congress at Chatillon. All this portion of the libel, therefore, is unworthy of being refuted; but three positive facts result from it.

1. That Austria concluded a treaty with the actual king of Naples, by virtue of which she guaranties to him, to his heirs, and successors, all the states of which he is in possession.

2. That, in virtue of this treaty, England immediately concluded an armistice with the king of Naples.

3. That the king of Naples, in virtue of this treaty, delivered from the yoke of France the Tuscan and Roman states, and that he afterwards evacuated the greatest part of the countries occupied by his arms.

A formal treaty then took place. The king of Naples has executed it. He has renounced all other means of defending his throne. He conquered provinces in favour of the allies, and he has given them up to them. If this treaty is now declared void, it will be necessary to burn the code of laws, annihilate all relations with civilized powers, tread under foot the laws of nations, throw us again into a state of interminable war; a condition, which, in the actual disposition of all Italy, would not be very unfavourable to a man of tried valour and uncontested military talents; and which, by recalling the idea of splendid victories, would revive, in the minds of the malcontents, the hope of independence, and present to the Italians the prospect of again forming themselves into a nation, but which would threaten, at the same time, all

the sovereigns, in spreading throughout Europe, scarcely tranquillized, the seeds of revolution, discord, and anarchy.

On examining the arguments adduced against the treaty concluded between the court of Vienna and that of Naples, we can scarcely believe our eyes. This treaty, it is said, has no longer an object; that is to say, the object has been obtained. But from what epoch has it been allowed to set aside the fact of having reaped the advantages of a convention, and afterwards to deliver oneself, with regard to him from whom these advantages have been derived, from the engagements which that convention enacts in his favour? Ought not such doctrine, preaching disloyalty and ingratitude, to fill with indignation those very powers, invited in this manner, so impudently, to stain themselves with such decided perfidy?

Austria, says this author, could not guaranty an illegitimate possession. This assertion becomes an act of accusation against Austria, as much, and more than against king Joachim I. But what is meant by an illegitimate possession? Is it that which is guaranteed by treaties, without the consent of the ancient proprietors of the countries thus disposed of? Why then, half

of the possessions of each of the powers, who intervene at congress, are nothing more than illegitimate possessions, against which it would be just to appeal. The thirty princes and imperial towns, whose sovereignty has been suppressed by Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and Austria, have an equal right, with the ancient kings of Naples, to make an appeal. The same holds good with regard to Mentz, Treves, Cologne, Venice, Genoa, and all Poland. In adopting this principle, the reigning family of Great Britain, who never were able to obtain an authentic renunciation of the Stewarts, would declare themselves usurpers from the year 1688 down to the extinction of that family, that is to say, during more than a century. In effect, what should we say, if this doctrine, publicly acknowledged, were to encourage the king of Saxony to protest purely and simply against the partition of his kingdom? (and he would lose nothing in doing so.) Who does not perceive, that the allied powers themselves would have rendered any protest on his part incontestably valid, and thus have caused in the minds of his ancient subjects a fermentation arising from their scruples and uncertainties, of which it would be difficult to calculate or foresee the consequences?

Austria, continues the author, could not treat with Joachim I, because none of the allies had a right to treat with the common enemy, of whom Murat was considered a part. But Austria treated with him for the purpose of directing his forces against the common enemy. England has acknowledged the treaty, since, in consequence of it, she has agreed upon an armistice. The king of Naples, in declaring against Bonaparte, ceased to make part of the common enemy, and became one of the allies.

He adds—The treaty is only conditional. The engagement entered into by Austria to obtain the adhesion of the allies to it not having been accomplished, the alliance and the guarantee equally fall to the ground *. Supposing this

* In virtue of the treaty of alliance between Naples and Austria, this latter power promised to employ its mediation, with the sovereign allies, in order to obtain their adhesion to the stipulations contained in this same treaty. Loyal in its engagements, and prudent in its conduct, Austria did not fail to consult the intentions of the allies, previous to signing the treaty, to know if they were disposed to fulfil successively the conditions, to which she was on the point of engaging herself with the king of Naples. All the allied powers, after having taken cognizance of the treaty, gave their approbation to it. England demanded and obtained some alterations and modifications, in consequence of which she concluded an armistice; which cannot be considered in any other light than as a

to be the fact, though the falsehood of it is proved by the armistice and the cessation of hostilities on the part of all the allies, it is a singular mode of reasoning to conclude, that a contracting party, who has not been able to fulfil one article of his engagements, should therefore be disengaged from the rest. It would be sufficient, then, in all treaties, that one of the parties

proof of her entire adhesion. As soon as the treaty was stipulated between Naples and Austria, Russia hastened to send a plenipotentiary to the head-quarters of the king of Naples, to negotiate a separate treaty, founded on the same basis as that of Austria. The conclusion of the campaign anticipated the negotiations about to be entered into between the Russian and Neapolitan plenipotentiaries; general count de Balascheff, charged with this mission by the emperor Alexander, was at the head-quarters at Piacenza when the armistice was signed between the French and allied armies, and was an eye witness of the efforts that the king had made, in order to promote the success of the campaign in Italy.

These references prove, that though Russia, England, and Prussia, had not previously stipulated particular treaties with Naples, they have not the less approved and acknowledged the one signed between the emperor of Austria and the king of Naples.

Justice, loyalty, and honour, require, that the magnanimous sovereigns, who demanded and set a value on the alliance of the king of Naples, in a critical and dangerous moment, should prevent a suspicion, too likely to arise, that they are now seeking to turn their arms and the success of their alliance, against an allied prince, from no other motive than because the danger is passed.

contrived, by the introduction of a third person, to avoid the execution of a part of the treaty, to free himself from the whole, after having reaped all the advantages of it. The king of Naples has fulfilled the treaty. If Austria met with obstacles in the execution of one of the conventions agreed upon, it would be but the more incumbent upon her to remain faithful to the remainder.

We now pass on to the relations that existed between the other courts of Europe, and Ferdinand IV and his family.

It is alleged, that a treaty was made with him by the court of Vienna in 1798. But the author himself, who pleads his cause, is agreed that, in the treaties of Luneville and Presburg, Austria did not stipulate any thing in his favour. Thus, from that epoch, the treaty of 1798 was regarded as of no effect. It is much more so now that it has been annulled and replaced by a treaty, directly contrary, of alliance and guarantee, between Austria and the king of Naples. The author acknowledges this truth by saying, that the treaty of 1798 may be considered as having ceased to exist, by right, but that it is renewed at the tribunal of honour. What would that honour be, that should be founded on the

violation of a formal compact, signed in the most critical circumstances, and violated only because the danger was passed!

The author speaks of the ties of kindred. But was it not thought just, necessary, and generous, on the 31st of March, 1814, that Austria should overlook the ties of kindred, which, it would seem to us, were of a much more positive nature? Nevertheless, there was no treaty existing between Austria and Louis XVIII: Austria had not engaged herself to any thing. Now that engagements the most sacred have been entered into with Joachim I, he dwells much on the ties of kindred, when they only relate to an aunt or a father-in-law; though these very ties of kindred were regarded as insignificant and of no importance, when they concerned a father and his daughter!

Russia, says he, had concluded a treaty of alliance and of guarantee with Ferdinand, in 1798, and united her troops to those of that prince in 1805. But, since that time, Russia has acknowledged the new sovereign of Naples. If subsequent treaties do not annul all prior ones, there will certainly be no farther need of treaties in diplomacy.

The author is under the necessity of avowing,

that Prussia never had any relation with the ancient sovereigns of Naples; but that she has had with the new king. Prussia has taken advantage, together with the entire coalition, of his co-operation: thus the only conclusion we can draw from what the author says is, that Prussia, in remaining faithful to the engagements entered into by Austria and sanctioned by the coalition (the proof of it is the cessation of hostilities), will not have to regret even so much as the rupture of any prior engagement.

Even France, by the avowal of the author, has not refrained from connecting herself indirectly with Joachim I; for in the peace concluded on the 30th of May, 1814, between France and Austria, the king of Naples is comprised therein, as an ally of the court of Vienna. It is in vain to object that the word *ally* comprehends only those of the coalition, and not the allies of each of the coalesced. This subtlety is void of sense. Read the treaty; you will see, that France has made peace, not with Austria and the allies of the coalition, but with Austria and her allies, that is to say, all the allies of Austria. Sophistry and interest alone can throw obscurity over expressions the meaning of which is so obvious. An argument is employed against Joachim I,

which it certainly would be unpleasant to see applied to any other prince.

The voice of the greatest part of the Neapolitans is against him, say they : we shall very soon prove, that this is false. But let us fix our attention a moment on a general consideration of the greatest importance. Is it now that a congress, whose object is to give peace to Europe, as well as to efface all ideas, customs, and revolutionary doctrines, and at the moment, too, that they are going—we must say it—to dispose of twenty nations without consulting them ; is it in a similar crisis, that they ought to throw themselves into an abyss of problematical researches concerning the wishes and pretended inclinations of the subjects of each principality ? Let them take care : I see only difficulties and embarrassments for all and each of the sovereigns. The Polish nation will demand its independence. A great portion of Belgium regrets its connexions with France, and will not be subject to Holland. The Genoese wish not to belong to his Sardinian majesty. The Pomeranians detest Denmark. The Italians aspire only to be Italians, and to establish an indigenuous government. All the Saxons, if they are consulted, will not consent to become Prussians.

Is it wished again to awaken the passions, to give importance to the chiefs of parties? Will sovereigns sign their adhesion to the sovereignty of the people, that may be held forth by the first who will declare themselves the organs of it? Governments, in these days, ought to pursue quite another line of conduct; they ought to give a fixed form to Europe, by wise territorial arrangements; then let them govern their people with equity, and respect their internal rights and privileges, but let them never bring in question again who are the sovereigns they would prefer.

Besides, as we have already affirmed, it is only because these considerations are of weight towards procuring a perfect stability in the order of things, that we oppose them to the author: for we might have limited ourselves to the simple denial of the fact—it is demonstrated to be false by the events themselves. When the crusade against Bonaparte took place, the allies no sooner appeared in a country, than the population joined itself to them. In Holland, in Germany, in Lombardy, the restoration of the ancient dynasties either preceded the entry of the enemies of the then existing government, or was coeval with it. No symptom of the kind has

ever manifested itself in Naples. The movements in other parts of Italy never communicated themselves to the Neapolitans. Their minds are impressed by remembrances of too terrible a nature. Their memory still retains the idea of the masts of their frigates serving as gibbets to their most estimable citizens. Joachim I has, without doubt, been dragged, like other princes, into the system of the fallen emperor, and has been forced to impose cruel sacrifices on his subjects; but he has done no more than what the kings of Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and Prussia have done, as well as all the princes of Germany; and, as soon as he could succeed in emancipating himself from the yoke, he gave way to the natural goodness of his heart, and now his government and his person are cherished by his subjects*.

* It will be remarked, that we have carefully abstained in this memorial from all that might have the appearance of panegyric, though, most assuredly, and under various points of view, there is room for eulogium; but praise has, for some time past, been too much profaned. We only wished to recal the principles, expose the true interests of Europe, independently of all the good we could say of the prince, whose cause we defend, because it is that which in part constitutes the peace and tranquillity of Europe. So much has been said of the enthusiasm of people for their sovereigns, and this enthusiasm has been transferred so rapidly from one

After having endeavoured to render of no effect the respect due to treaties; after having preached the want of good faith; after having changed the nature of facts, and charged Joachim I with doctrines the most contradictory, and even those of jacobinism, the author develops the means, which, according to his manner of thinking, ought to be employed for the expulsion of that prince. If the sovereigns be disposed to tear their compacts, and falsify their promises; if Austria participated in this perfidy, of which we cannot, without doing a mortal injury, suspect any one of the sovereigns

sovereign to another, from the first to the second, from the second to the first, then from both to a third or a fourth, that the word itself inspires distrust. We have therefore confined ourselves here to what is incontestible, since we affirm no more than the simple fact. The Neapolitans have proved their attachment to their new sovereign in the clearest manner; as, whilst all other nations, great and small, have concurred in the overthrow of their new dynasties, there has not been the smallest attempt of the kind in the kingdom of Naples. If we were desirous of adding, to the evidence of facts, some conjectures founded on the highest probabilities, on probabilities equivalent to certainties, we might assert, that this favourable disposition, which has retained the Neapolitans in their fidelity to Joachim I, is an assured guarantee, that the king of Naples will find them most zealous defenders of his person and kingdom, if an useless, shocking, and inexcusable perfidy should menace his throne.

of our days, the cause of Joachim I would be dubious, though certainly it would not be desperate: in concluding, we will prove it.

Let us first observe, that the author is, secretly, so convinced of the unworthiness of what he proposes, that he honours Russia, Prussia, and Austria, so far, as to except them from any participation in this injustice. He grants, that Austria, in her particular situation, may, as a consequence of the treaty of the 11th of January last, refuse to take an active part. In the language of the author, avowing that she may do it, is as much as to say, that she ought. But then, in what situation is Austria placed? Scarcely established in her possessions in Italy, can she remain a tranquil spectator of a war, at once civil and foreign, kindling on the borders of her new acquisitions? Will she not have equally to fear the despair of a prince, whose courage is so well known, and the assent of the Italians to any standard raised in their name, and in favour of their independance? And if France, and Spain, whom the author alone invokes, as the intended aggressors, should succeed in their enterprise, what would be the situation of Austria, with respect to these powers? By her treaty, she will have multiplied their embar-

rassments ; by her inaction, she will have done nothing for them. Already is she reproached, as all the world knows, with a co-operation somewhat equivocal, towards the overthrow of her son-in-law. Will she leave the chances of the war, and, what is no less important, the profits of victory, to those powers, who have imbibed so unfavourable a disposition? We will not dwell on this subject, because it is too evident; and, writing only in favour of the peace of Europe, we wish to avoid every thing, that might become the cause of discord between sovereigns. We have said enough to prove, that Austria cannot reflect too seriously on the subject. It is evident, that she will ever have, in Joachim I, a neighbour devoted to her interest — a grateful and faithful ally. What can she hope, in admitting the other hypothesis?

We have asserted, that even supposing that there should be, against the king of Naples, an European crusade equally powerful, scandalous, and disloyal; his cause, though exposed to danger, would not be desperate, as we have already shown. His soldiers, though small in number, if we compare them to the armies of the different powers united, are at once brave, apt to war,

and well disciplined. Apprehensions of the implacable revenge of their ancient sovereign plead eloquently in his favour. An ardent thirst of becoming a nation devours the rest of Italy. Who knows but that the retrograde measures, carried on and continued with so much precipitation, in certain countries of Europe, might procure him, in more than one place, many secret adherents? Can it be desirable to renew civil commotions? It would be a great misfortune, and it is far from our wishes. For this reason, we conjure the allied powers not to provoke it; but to remain faithful to their treaties, to justice, to loyalty—their most noble appendage—and, finally, to a prince, who, in a most decisive moment, caused the balance to incline in their favour, and who has served them at the risk of his life.

It has been endeavoured to represent the cause of Ferdinand IV as that of all the kings. We take the liberty of asserting, that the cause of an immense majority of kings is attached to that of Joachim I. If it is an usurpation to possess states through revolutionary events, we must stifle as usurpations all acquisitions of territory, made by the other sovereigns, for the last twenty-five years. They destroy their titles to their new

possessions, by destroying that of Joachim I to the throne of Naples.

Finally. — Joachim I is on the throne; Italy is at peace. Ferdinand IV reigns in Sicily, happier than other princes, for whom no appeal is made; he has preserved a kingdom. Allowing things to remain in *statu quo*, will be to prolong, and to consolidate peace. Any attack made on Joachim will be the renewal of war. This war may take a turn, which cannot be foreseen. Interests, which have clashed during the revolution, and those which the revolution has given birth to, are on the alert. Their natural opposition may rekindle a spark, which ought, on the contrary, to be smothered. Joachim I, by his rank, is connected with the interest of sovereigns: by his particular situation, he depends, also, on those of the revolution. In attacking him, you force him to put himself at the head of the new and terrible interests. In attacking him, Italy bursts out into a flame, and this flame is kindling under sufficiently slight heaps of cinders in the rest of Europe. The revolutionists of France had fewer means in the beginning, yet their arms have been carried over, and their principles have upset the world. There is no country really in a

state of tranquillity—no discussion is forgotten—
all is passive and benumbed, but every thing ex-
ists. Justice requires that treaties should be
observed; prudence accords with justice. To
rekindle the war would be to give the signal for
various explosions. Wherefore, any attempt to
dethrone Joachim I is to replace Europe in the
midst of this dangerous crisis.

The wisdom and loyalty of the powers united
at the congress of Vienna, will find means to
preserve us from the danger.

THE END.

REFLECTIONS OF A NEAPOLITAN

ON

A MEMORIAL, BEARING THE TITLE

OF

OBSERVATIONS

ON

A P A M P H L E T,

ENTITLED

THE

BOURBONS OF NAPLES.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PH.D. THESIS

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

PH.D. THESIS

REFLECTIONS,

&c. &c. &c.

A MEMORIAL has fallen into our hands, bearing the title of "Observations on a Pamphlet, concerning the Bourbons of Naples." This work, no doubt recently issued from the press, appears to have been communicated but to a restricted number of persons, and not to be in general circulation; however, it is an extremely interesting paper, and seems to us worthy of fixing the attention of every sovereign, of their ministers, and of every well informed person, who takes a part in the political affairs of Europe, or who attentively observes their progress.

The author has not thought fit to name himself; but, on reading his memorial, we discern the profound thinker, the enlightened legislator, and the wise and independent philosopher, whose principles are equally remote from all re-

volutionary exaggeration, and from base concessions in favour of injustice or despotism; sustaining his opinions with vigour and dignity, in that just medium, which is the line of all virtue, of all public loyalty, and of every wise government; the line of honour and good faith, the only one on which individuals, sovereigns, and nations, ought to calculate for their safety, prosperity, and happiness.

Assuming the defence of Joachim I seems to have been, in the intention of the author, only a fine pretext, and a favourable occasion, for displaying with energy the importance and utility of these immortal principles. At one time, he makes it evident, that Louis XVIII, by faithfully persevering in them, deserved to see the end of his misfortunes, and to ascend with glory on the throne of his forefathers. Another while he is exasperated, that any one should dare to propose to one of the greatest potentates of Europe, a departure from them, after having persisted in them with constancy; a circumstance, that rendered them sacred in the eyes of his people, during their misfortunes, and which has now rendered them great in their successes. And, finally, he proves to us, that Ferdinand IV, the former sovereign of Naples, has forfeited,

by a violation of those principles, every right to a sceptre, which he twice abandoned ; and has thus interdicted to himself all hope of again reigning over a nation, on which he had revenged himself so cruelly for not having been able to defend itself.

If the interests of Joachim had been the principal object of the memorial of which we have been speaking ; or, if the author had been possessed of more copious materials, he would have endeavoured more particularly to demonstrate the formal engagements, as well as those of honour, that have been contracted with this prince by all the potentates ; and we think, that he would have found a considerable degree of satisfaction in speaking at greater length of the mutual ties of confidence, gratitude, and inclination, that unite a generous nation with a generous sovereign. With so able a pen, these great considerations, strongly developed, would have forcibly convinced every one what respect ought to be shown to a throne, nobly acquired, nobly occupied, and which, if attacked, will be nobly defended.

What the author of the considerations has not done, we will make an attempt to do. We will first expose, what has come to our knowledge

of the political connexions between Joachim I and the sovereign members of the coalition, of which he was one. We will then speak of the internal state of the kingdom of Naples, and of the sentiments of the Neapolitan nation for its king.

We flatter ourselves, that what we are going to alledge will prove clearly, that the rights of a sovereign were never founded on engagements of a more solemn and sacred nature, on the part of the different powers; nor on the unanimous voice and affections of a people better proved.



*The Political Relations of Joachim I with the
different Sovereigns of Europe.*

JOACHIM I, elevated in 1808 to the throne of Naples, which he received in exchange for the grand duchy of Berg, was recognised by all the different powers of Europe; and maintained a friendly intercourse, for a long time, with all the sovereign princes. Austria, Russia, Bavaria, and Holland, had their plenipotentiaries at his court, as well as France and Spain.

The war, which he was dragged into, by the French government, as an auxiliary, though it, for a while, interrupted this good understanding, did not change any thing in his position, as a sovereign. Kings, on going to war, do not intend to question their respective titles; nor do they cease, reciprocally, to consider them as sacred. When it happens, that, by the fate of war, a monarch is dethroned, it is a catastrophe, which only the most extraordinary circumstances, can justify: such as bad faith, abuse of power, obstinacy in a desperate struggle; or from the political existence of some prince being incompatible with the safety of certain states. Sovereigns are interested in preventing similar catastrophes, which astonish the people, and diminish, in their opinion, the respect due to the prerogatives of thrones. For which reason, in the beginning, they are never the object of the war; nor do they ever become so, but when the war receives, from events or from the passions of one of the belligerents, that implacable character, which admits of no alternative. In all other cases, the cessation of hostilities brings back sovereigns to those relations, which existed before the war. Constant usage, founded on the public law of Europe, would, by the single act

of the cessation of hostilities have replaced king Joachim in the same situation, with respect to the continental powers, that he was in before he combated against them, as an auxiliary of France, if arrangements, of which we shall soon speak, had not rendered him their ally.

England, alone, not having acknowledged him, would have preserved her right to dispute his title. The other coalesced powers could not have had the smallest pretext to bring in question his political existence: they could not have done it, without offending the sovereign majesty of thrones; without being wanting to themselves; without giving a scandalous example, unknown amongst nations, and at all times dangerous to princes.

But we shall successively demonstrate, that all the coalesced powers, even England, and, we ought to have said, England above all, have contracted with Joachim a state of alliance, which would oblige them to defend him against Ferdinand of Sicily, if Ferdinand were an object of fear to him; as they would have been equally obliged to have defended him against Napoleon, if he had preserved his power.

The Relations of Joachim with Austria.

THE engagements entered into by king Joachim with Austria, and by Austria with king Joachim, are positive, clear, and incontestable. Fixed by a solemn treaty, they cannot be called in doubt. A reciprocal alliance and guarantee of their respective possessions in Italy; the king obliges himself to furnish, in case of war, a contingency of thirty thousand men: Austria, in the same case, obliges herself to furnish a contingency of sixty thousand: Austria promises to procure the accession of the allies, &c. &c.

The stipulations of the treaty have been executed by the king: thirty thousand men, and upwards, marched against the common enemy, who was forced by the Neapolitan army to evacuate all the fortified places he had occupied on this side the Po and the Tanaro. The viceroy was constrained to abandon the Adige, and to retire behind the Mincio. The Austrian general himself acknowledged, that these successes were entirely owing to the movements of the king of Naples.

Soon after, the king, at the head of his army, aided only by a single division, composed of

Austrian and English troops, rendered himself master of Modena, Reggio, Guastalla, and Parma; and was on the point of forcing the lines of Piacenza, which would have obliged the viceroy to evacuate all Italy, when, an armistice having been concluded between that prince and marshal Bellegarde, hostilities ceased.

When the war was terminated, the king gave up the countries he had conquered, to Austria, to the duke of Modena, to the grand duke of Tuscany, and to the pope; only keeping in his hands the marches, where, at the request of the Austrian and English ministers and generals, he cantoned a part of his troops.

Austria has not shown, nor will show hereafter, less fidelity than king Joachim. Ever since the conclusion of the treaty, that power has never ceased to act like a good ally, and an affectionate friend, of the court of Naples. The king will never have any cause to regret having placed an unbounded confidence in the hereditary loyalty of the house of Austria — in the personal loyalty which so eminently distinguishes the emperor Francis.

The objections adduced against the treaty of alliance of the 11th January 1814, in that weak and pitiful composition, entitled, *The Bourbons*

of *Naples*, did not merit the honour of a refutation; they have, however, been refuted, by the author of *The Observations*, with a force of reasoning and talents worthy of combating and of vanquishing a better conceived opposition. The absurdity, the indecency, the immorality, of these objections, have been controverted with an overwhelming evidence.

We will add but one remark: one of the principal arguments employed by the apologist for the Bourbons of Naples is, that none of the allies could treat separately with the common enemy. But who was the common enemy? It was Napoleon—Napoleon only; for king Joachim was not immediately at war against the coalition. He had never combated but as an auxiliary of France, like the kings of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, the grand duke of Baden, and all the princes of the confederation of the Rhine, with which Austria entered into treaty successively, as with the king of Naples, and nearly in the same terms.

The four great powers had been always agreed, *that the treaties concluded upon between themselves, should not be an obstacle to any engagements that the high contracting parties might have made with other states, nor hinder them*

from forming others, in the view of obtaining the same happy result (namely, the success of the war against Napoleon). And what could more effectually concur to this end, than the detaching from Napoleon his only remaining ally? an ally who, evidently, then held the fate of Italy in his hands.

The stipulation we have just cited forms the 14th article of a treaty concluded at Chaumont, on the 1st of March, 1814, between Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia. The treaty of January 11, between Austria and Naples, a circumstance well known at that period, is manifestly comprised in the guarantee which that article contains? Accordingly, the different cabinets have never raised the smallest doubt respecting the validity of the above treaty; and it is notorious, that, in the conferences at Chaillon, the French plenipotentiaries, having presented divers propositions concerning Italy, were answered by the ministers of the four great powers, "that Italy did not form part of the question, the coalition having resolved to re-establish the ancient sovereigns, except at Naples, where they had acknowledged king Joachim, by virtue of a treaty which Austria had concluded with him."

This declaration, bearing the signature of the four ministers, in the protocol, shows, that Austria had endeavoured, with efficacy and good faith, to procure the formal accession of her allies to her treaty with Naples.

The relations existing between king Joachim and the emperor of Austria are those, then, of two sincere allies, who have candidly executed the conditions of their alliance; who have rendered each other reciprocal services, which are equally binding on their feelings, their interests, and their honour. To propose to the most powerful of the two to declare war against the other, or even to break with him, after having reaped the advantages of his alliance, would be to propose a perfidious action equally unworthy of his noble character as of the majesty of his crown. Where is the minister, that would dare to offend so great a sovereign, by making him a similar proposition? It could never be imagined by any but by a mercenary writer, incapable of conceiving properly a subject he has dared to discuss, and still more incapable of raising himself to that sublimity of sentiment, which, for the glory of thrones, and for the happiness of nations, ought to animate the hearts of kings.

*The Relations of King Joachim with respect to
Great Britain.*

THE most sacred engagements bind England, more than any other of the coalesced powers, to the cause of king Joachim ; the more especially, as betwixt the two powers there have been fewer formal stipulations, each having taken the most important resolutions, with respect to the other, under the safeguard of good faith and honour only.

In fact, king Joachim, from a perfect reliance on the word of English ministers, detached himself from the alliance of France, to join the coalition. Upon their word he began his operations, and continued to carry on the war ; upon their word he gave up his conquests : it might be said, he rendered them, at one time, the arbiters of his power, the depositaries of his crown. Political history, certainly, does not offer a more noble example of the homage rendered to the character of a great nation, and of so honourable a testimony of the confidence reposed in the probity of ministers.

From the moment of his accession to the throne, the king of Naples became sensible how advantageous an alliance with England would

be to the interests of his kingdom; and when he received the proposal to enter into the coalition, he declared, in the most precise terms, to Austria, that he could never take the resolution to carry his arms beyond the frontiers of his kingdom, nor ever take an active part in the war against France, if he had not a previous treaty of peace and alliance with England.

The views of the king, upon this point, proved themselves perfectly conformable to those of Austria, and the entire coalition. A treaty between Great Britain and Naples would allow of the disposal and employment, against the common enemy, not only of the forces of king Joachim, but also those which the English had in Sicily. So that, when Austria sent a plenipotentiary to Naples, she declared, that England was ready to accede to the treaty of alliance, which she proposed; and that lord Aberdeen was provided with full powers necessary to that effect. This declaration received confirmation, by the exhibition of a letter from the English minister, in which it was enjoined on lord William Bentinck to lose no time in concluding a convention with the government of Naples, which should put an end to hostilities between the two states. This convention took place: it

was not a mere armistice ; it was placing things on the footing of the most perfect peace. A free intercourse of commercial relations was authorized, and every favour assured them. It was declared, that the ports should be reciprocally open to the people of the two nations : this carried with it the positive recognizance of the Neapolitan flag : in short, the convention was so perfectly considered, by the contracting parties, as having the force of a treaty of alliance, though it might not have the form, that no time was lost in combining the plan of the campaign, in which the Austrian, English, and Neapolitan troops, should simultaneously act together.

The king opened the campaign : he was already at Bologna, where he expected to receive the ratification of his treaty with Austria, when, on the arrival of a messenger from Basle, he learnt, that modifications were proposed to be made in the treaty.

His surprise was, at first, very great, as it must naturally have been, for the treaty had been stipulated in terms previously approved of by the Austrian government : however, he soon perceived, in the proposition made to him, that he ought to consider it as a fresh proof of the great desire that the cabinet of Austria had to

render the accession of England to the treaty more solemn and assured.

In fact, it was not the Austrian ministry, that had conceived the idea of the proposed modifications; it was the English ministry; and the king was assured, that, if they were admitted, the treaty might be regarded as being in common with Great Britain. These modifications did not in any way alter the substance of the stipulations previously signed. What they more essentially contained, concerned the compensation, that might be due to the king of Sicily, for the loss of the kingdom of Naples. The propositions, that took place on this subject, were highly acceptable to the feelings of the king: he considered them as a reiterated proof of the noble loyalty of the British government; he accepted them; he caused his acknowledgments to be made to lord Castlereagh, informing him, that he was going to act on the word of an English minister, with as much confidence as if he already held in his hand the most authentic treaty.

Notwithstanding this assurance, the English government thought proper, that the king should not remain without a formal guarantee. It is averred, and we have reason to think it perfectly

true, that lord William Bentinck, having arrived at the head-quarters of the king, at Bologna, towards the end of March, or the beginning of April, declared, that the English government entirely adhered to the treaty concluded between his majesty the emperor of Austria and his majesty the king of Naples, and that it assented to the advantages stipulated in favour of the king, under the same conditions insisted upon by Austria, of an active and immediate co-operation of the Neapolitan army. It is even added, that this declaration, which perfectly agreed with all that had been verbally said by lord Castlereagh, was confirmed by the communication of several dispatches from that minister; the object of which was to accomplish the promises made to the king. In the mean time, the circumstances of the war became urgent; the king gave battle; English troops fought valiantly, under his orders, together with Neapolitan troops. Is not this affixing a most striking seal to a solemn treaty? Can there exist a more sacred alliance, than that which results from dangers shared, blood spilt, and glory acquired, in a common cause, upon the same field of battle? After such expressions, both by word of mouth and in writing, after such facts, the

least doubt respecting the resolutions of the English government, with regard to king Joachim, would be an insult to the English character. The king, in giving himself up to the confidence which that character inspired him with, has the greater right to calculate on the support of a nation and of a government, that knows well how to set a value on all that is great, loyal, and generous.

Many are the precious advantages, which Great Britain has derived from her being in a state of alliance with the king of Naples. Independently of those which she derived in common with the coalesced powers, it was that state of alliance, which enabled her to withdraw her troops from Sicily, to conduct them to the theatre of war in Italy, to employ them in the conquest of Genoa, and, afterwards, to embark them for the war in America.

We will not enter on the farther advantages that this alliance holds out to Great Britain. We will not place a column of interested calculations, by the side of the laws of honour; honour calls on the English ministry to complete all their promises, and to gratify all the hopes that have been given to the king. To the true English heart, honour never speaks in vain.

The Relations of King Joachim with Russia.

WHEN proposals were made to the king, by order of the emperor of Austria, to join the coalition, the sovereigns of the four grand coalesced states, and their ministers, were all following the movements of the armies, and constantly met at the same head quarters. Austria declared, that she had consulted her allies, and promised their adherence to the treaty. Could the august emperor of Russia disavow it? Could he disavow such a declaration, such a promise, to the august emperor of Austria? Certainly not: on the contrary, he has confirmed them; and, as far as circumstances have permitted, he has executed what he had promised. He not only manifested the greatest satisfaction, on seeing the king form a part of the European confederation; he not only approved of the treaty concluded by Austria; but he was desirous of concluding a similar one himself, with the king of Naples. One of his principal ministers of state, count de Balascheff, was sent to the head quarters of king Joachim, and presented to him a letter from the emperor Alexander, in which he expresses himself in the most

obliging terms, on the renewal of their ancient and amicable relations, and accredits the count de Balascheff, in order to conclude a treaty of alliance with the king, on the same basis with that of Austria. This minister was received by the king with the highest distinction, and he followed his head quarters until the conclusion of the campaign. In company with the Austrian minister, he was seen to take part at the conferences, which were held on the first days of April, at Revere, when the king concerted, with the Austrian and English generals, the military operations that were to be executed. In the mean time, the negotiations were commenced; and, if we may give credit to the reports, that were circulated at the time, all the points were agreed upon; all the articles of a treaty of alliance were digested, and the treaty was on the point of being signed, at Parma, after the passage of the Taro, when the news arrived of the events, which had terminated the war. An alliance against Napoleon was no longer an object. The act was not completed, but the Russian minister continued to be accredited at the court of king Joachim. He went to Naples, where he resided for some time; and, on his quitting the capital, he left general baron de

Thuyll charged with the continuation of the affairs, that had been confided to him. The emperor Alexander has, in due form, confirmed this mission of general Thuyll, as actual resident at the court of Naples.

Will these relations permit, we take the liberty to ask, the rights of the king of Naples to the preservation of his crown to be questioned in the presence of the emperor of Russia? What circumstances can possibly have altered these rights, after so great a monarch has recognised them by the solemn acts above cited?

A sovereign, who, together with all the heroic virtues, that form a great king, has carried on the throne all the mild virtues, which honour a private life; could he ever say, "There is a prince, who has acquired great military renown, and who governs his states with prudence and wisdom; his power is limited; but there was a time when the destinies of Europe were unsettled; his name and his army might contribute towards fixing them; I renewed with him my former friendship; I negotiated a treaty of alliance with him: my projects are now accomplished; he has fought valiantly to ensure their success; I declare myself his enemy."
 . . . No, no; such language will never issue

from the mouth of the magnanimous Alexander. He will never allow it to be suspected, that such sentiments have insinuated themselves into his heart. He desired to be the ally of the king of Naples, when at the head of his army; he will be desirous of being so still, after the victories which have ensured his triumph. In prosperity, great characters will never deviate from their virtuous inclination; it only inspires them with still more generous and more virtuous designs.



Relations between King Joachim and Prussia.

GREAT part of what we have said, with respect to Russia, is applicable to Prussia.

The king of Prussia, as well as the emperor Alexander, had cognizance of, and approved of the overtures of alliance made by Austria to the king of Naples. When this treaty was signed and ratified, the Neapolitan ministers, attendant on the emperor of Austria, had the honour of being presented to his majesty the king of Prussia, who received them with distinction and goodness, as ministers of an allied power.

And could it be otherwise, if, as we are assured, one of the stipulations, which bound the quadruple alliance of Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia, enacted, that any treaty, which Austria might conclude with the princes who should accede to the coalition, should, of course, be common to the four powers? Such an agreement rendered useless any formal adhesion. Thus we have seen, that the emperor of Russia did not propose a mere adhesion, but a personal and direct treaty, with the king.

However it may have been, all Europe has witnessed one striking fact, which cannot leave a doubt of the adhesion of all the coalesced sovereigns to the treaty concluded by Austria. The treaty was scarcely known, when each of the allies gave orders, that the Neapolitan soldiers made prisoners while fighting in the French armies, should be immediately sent back to their country; and not only that these brave soldiers should be free, but that their arms should be restored to them, who, for the future, were to be employed against the common enemy.

The emperor of Russia and the king of Prussia gave particular proofs of friendship to the king, by the good treatment his soldiers experienced.

About this epoch, the fortress of Dantzic sur-

rendered: one thousand Neapolitans formed part of the garrison; their course was directed to Italy; and, while crossing Germany, at that time occupied by the armies of so many powers, they were treated every where as allied troops, and every where received with the honours due to their courage and good conduct.

Is it not evident, then, that, when Prussia acted in this manner, she showed herself, as well as Russia and all the other powers, the ally of the king of Naples? Mutual good offices, arising from a good understanding, cannot cease to exist between two sovereigns, who have no interest to contest, and who ought naturally to be united by the particular ties of consideration, esteem, and affection, formed under circumstances, that can never be effaced from the memory.



On the Relations of King Joachim with the King of Bavaria, the King of Wurtembergh, and the other Sovereigns of Germany.

THE cause of the king of Bavaria, of the king of Wurtembergh, and of all the princes, who formed the confederation, is absolutely the same

with that of the king of Naples : like him, they were a long time the allies of Napoleon ; like him, they took a part in all the wars, that Napoleon undertook, during the existence of their alliance ; like him, in short, they detached themselves from France, and negotiated with the coalition, through the mediation of Austria, when they saw that the obstinacy of Napoleon threatened Europe with eternal war.

If the treaty with the king of Naples be not respected, they cannot have much reliance on those, which they themselves have stipulated ; if his rights are contested, they ought to be alarmed for their own titles, and for their very existence.

The friendly relations that existed between king Joachim and the sovereigns of Germany, the diplomatic relations of the two courts of Naples and Bavaria, have never been interrupted ; a Neapolitan minister has always resided, and continues to reside, at Munich ; a Bavarian minister has always resided, and continues to reside, at Naples.

Far from finding enemies in the sovereigns of Germany, the king of Naples ought to consider them as friends, for their interests are the same.

*The Relations of King Joachim with the Courts
of the Bourbons of France and Spain.*

AFTER having spoken of all the sovereigns, who have combated in the war of the coalition; let us examine, with respect to the king of Naples, what is the situation, and what are the interests, of the houses of the Bourbons, who have derived so much profit by the success of the war; in which, from their particular situation, they were not able to take an active part. These two august houses actually reign, and they owe the restoration of their crowns to the efforts of all the coalesced sovereigns of Europe. Shall the first exercise of their power be to destroy that of one of the princes, who made a part of that immortal coalition? This is what is proposed in the pamphlet entitled, “Of the Bourbons of Naples!”

The author, obliged to acknowledge that the sovereigns, whose alliance king Joachim had embraced, could not, with honour, declare themselves against him, seems to demand of them to allow France and Spain to act, though, according to his opinion, they are not connected by the same ties of honour. But who would not be

shocked at such an abominable idea? What! Will the Bourbons not hold as sacred all those that have concurred in restoring them to their thrones? After having reaped the benefit, they are arbitrarily to establish themselves the judges of their benefactors; and, without provocation, turn against one of them the very arms they have received from him. Oh, far be from us, the idea of such ingratitude! Our respect for two great sovereigns, and for two great nations, forbids us to suppose, that such sentiments can ever have a place in the breast of a king of France, or in that of a king of Spain.

Let us listen to more noble sentiments; sentiments worthy of a son of St. Louis and of Henry IV.

On the 4th of June, in his discourse to the chamber of deputies, he said, "I have made peace with Austria, Russia, England, and Prussia, in which their allies are comprised; that is to say, all the princes of Christendom. The war has been universal, our reconciliation is equally so."

Was Louis XVIII, when he spoke thus, ignorant that Joachim I reigned at Naples, or did he dissemble, in the bottom of his heart, his intention of shortly declaring war against him?

No; he was not ignorant of it; he did not dissemble; he followed the wise dictates of a generous and a noble soul; he promised peace and gratitude to all the princes of Europe, who conquered for him.

Long before the 4th of June, the prince of Metternich, minister of Austria for foreign affairs, had notified to prince de Benevento the treaty, by which the king of Naples had entered into the coalition.

We cannot suppose, that the king of Spain entertained sentiments less worthy the sovereign majesty, than those demonstrated by the chief of the illustrious family of the Bourbons; and we shall soon see, that the same sentiments have guided his conduct.

The author of the Observations has shown, that the policy of Europe, and particularly that of Austria, would oppose any enterprise, that had for its object the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon in Italy. On a question of so decisive a nature, it is not possible to add any thing to what he has said. Our researches shall be to see, if it would be the interest of the Bourbons of France and Spain to attack the king of Naples, and whether they could advance a pretext for such an aggression.

After the troubles that France and Spain have

experienced, the things more particularly required by these two kingdoms are, peace; internal tranquillity; a good administration; the revival of commerce; and the decrease of the public burthens. Projects of war, which remove to a distance benefits so evidently necessary, would exhibit more ambition than prudence, in the cabinets of Paris and Madrid; they would astonish all Europe; they would revive the jealous fears, that the enterprises of the Bourbons formerly inspired; and their power might, perhaps, be exposed to formidable attacks, before it be re-established on a solid basis.

Ah! what ought to be the feelings of the people, on seeing the wars renewed, which had already been so fatal to them; on seeing their blood and treasures lavished on distant expeditions, without any prospect of advantage to them, while so many precious objects at home demand the solicitude of their sovereign?

Franquillize the minds of men in fermentation; repair the misfortunes and acts of injustice of latter times; re-establish the finances; revive industry; pacify the colonies, and encourage their cultivation. Do not these great objects suffice to employ all the activity of the French and Spanish governments?

Ought not these governments to fear, that, in rekindling the war, they might give back to parties and factions still existing a considerable degree of strength ?

In France, above all, could Louis XVIII forget what part king Joachim had in the immortal glory the French armies have acquired, during twenty years of warfare ? and could he, without causing a very painful sentiment, oblige so many brave soldiers to march against him who so often led them to victory ?

The wisdom of the kings of France and Spain has acknowledged the truth of what we have just observed : so that these sovereigns have never manifested, against king Joachim, any hostile intention, which nothing could justify.

After having declared, that he had made peace with all the princes of Christendom, what motive could Louis XVIII have for declaring war against king Joachim ? What circumstances, since the 4th of June, could have produced a subject for war between France and Naples ? Certainly none : therefore, though the formalities of diplomatic communication have not yet been completely established, all communications between the two states have been constantly marked by a good understanding. Commerce is free

and open between the two kingdoms: Neapolitan vessels enter the harbours of France; the French flag undulates in the ports of Naples. All the Neapolitan prisoners, which Napoleon had retained, Louis XVIII has sent back. A Neapolitan consul resides at Marseilles, and speaks advantageously of the reception that he meets with from all the public authorities. Every thing, then, shows a state of peace between the two crowns; and this peace ought not to be troubled.

It is not otherwise with the court of Madrid. The Bourbons of Spain having formally recognized the separation of the kingdom of Naples from Sicily, it cannot be supposed, that they will undertake a war in favour of Ferdinand of Sicily. They have, hitherto, shown only the most peaceable inclinations.

All the Neapolitan prisoners in Spain have been set at liberty. A Spanish consul resides at Naples. Many Spanish vessels consigned to our ports, have been allowed freely to enter, and have received such attentions as were to be expected from a friendly nation.

A Spanish privateer having retained a Neapolitan vessel, the vessel was declared an unjust prize by the admiralty of Spain; and the sen-

inclinations of the king of Naples, whose views have no other object, than that of the peace of Europe, and the happiness of his subjects.



The Relations of King Joachim with the Pope:

UNDER the auspices of the king of Naples, the pope retook possession of his states, previously delivered by the Neapolitan troops. All the time that these countries remained under the royal administration, they had not to support any of the extraordinary contributions, nor any of the requisitions, that war authorizes, and which too often degenerate into odious vexations. The king, on the contrary, diminished the established taxes; consecrated considerable sums to public utility; caused all persecution against the clergy to cease; restored divers pious institutions; and prepared, by all these measures, and as much as circumstances would permit, the return of the sovereign pontiff into the capital of the Christian world.

When the holy father, on returning from his painful exile, arrived on the lines occupied by the army of the king, his majesty gave orders,

that all sorts of honours should be shown to him, and tendered him the most obliging offers.

His holiness, passing through Bologna, paid a solemn visit to the king, to testify his gratitude to him.

When he chose to go to Rome, the king gave him up the two departments of Rome and Thrasimene, which formed the entire ecclesiastical state, at the period when he was forced to absent himself from his capital. The king had even the delicate attention to place under the authority of the holy father, the duchy of Urbino, and the countries situated on the left of the Mitauro, which had nothing to do with the two departments, that he might have the satisfaction of going from Cesena, where he was at that time, to Rome, across the territories subject to his dominion.

The pope was desirous, that the king should have given up to him, at the same time, the Marches, in the same manner that he wished for Avignon to be restored to him by France, and the legations by Austria; but the demand of his holiness was in contradiction to the dispositions agreed upon between the king and the allies. The pope was convinced, and contented himself with what was restored to him.

Since that period, the holy father has, without doubt, preserved, and often manifested, a desire to have possession of the Marches; but it is at congress only that arrangements can be made for conciliating the interests of the holy chair, and the stipulations of treaties.

This difficulty, which it was not in the power of the king to resolve, has not proved hurtful to the good understanding, which, for so many reasons, ought to be established and maintained between the courts of Rome and Naples.

A Neapolitan consul, and a diplomatic agent, reside at Rome, and all their concerns with the pontifical authorities are particularly satisfactory. The king has long distinguished and appreciated the personal virtues of the holy father: he is penetrated with the most profound veneration for him. The pope has frequently given to the king particular marks of his benevolence.

The interests of these two sovereigns are almost the same, and are in apparent opposition only on one point. This opposition is not the work nor the wish of the pope, neither is it the wish of the king. It is a treaty and the political and military conventions, that have established it. When congress shall have conciliated and fixed the rights and claims of princes, there can

no longer remain between them any other than friendly relations, and the personal sentiments of respect they profess for each other.

The pope can never be otherwise than the friend of a king, who has re-established him in his states.



*Of the Internal State of the Kingdom of Naples,
and of the Sentiments of the Neapolitan Na-
tion for King Joachim.*

THE exposition, that we have presented, of the relations existing between the king of Naples and the various powers of Europe, proves, that none of them have either interest or object to declare war against him; and that, on the contrary, almost all of them are tied to his cause, by positive treaties, or by engagements of honour, which we cannot suppose for a moment, without offence, that they wish to infringe.

Let us now see if it be with any foundation, that the advocate of the Bourbons of Sicily invokes against him the voice of the Neapolitan nation.

King Joachim is the first sovereign, who has justly appreciated this brave nation; ingenious,

ardent, and calculated to succeed in various ways. The former government seems to have been afraid of the energy of the nation, and to have employed all its care in depressing it, or of directing it to objects foreign to the great interests of the state; therefore, when it was required to make efforts, no resources could be found, in a country which might furnish such powerful ones. The Neapolitans had shown, however, under Charles III, what a sovereign, worthy of governing them, might expect.

King Joachim has given marks of esteem and affection to the Neapolitans: their attachment and devotion to him have corresponded in return. He was scarcely seated on the throne, before he had frequent opportunities of showing how lively an interest he took in every thing that concerned the rights or the honour of the nation, that Providence had submitted to his sceptre.

He was seen resisting, with firmness, the French government, at that time all-powerful, and which he had so many reasons for treating with caution, whenever it was necessary to defend a national privilege, or the dignity of the crown. He was heard to say, on a solemn occasion, *I will reign independently, or I will cease to reign.*

From that moment, the Neapolitans felt, that they had a king truly a Neapolitan, and who would conduct them to new destinies.

At his voice, a people, who seemed to have but little inclination to a military state, took arms almost universally. The regular army was carried successively to ninety thousand men; and sixty thousand legionaries of the national guard, since 1809, almost without the assistance of the troops of the line, have defended the coasts of the kingdom, at the same time that they every where maintained the tranquillity of the interior, which hordes of banditti, sent from Sicily, endeavoured, without ceasing, to trouble.

Europe has had a proof of the conduct of the Neapolitan troops. From the earliest campaign, they rivalled the veteran troops of Europe; and the talents as well as the bravery of the officers made them particularly distinguished. However, the army alone did not occupy the king; by his care, the internal administration of the kingdom was organised; roads were traced; wise establishments were founded; useful works, and even works of embellishment, were undertaken for the capital. All these various objects, without doubt, entailed great expenses, which placed the king under the necessity of requiring consi-

derable sums from his people ; but the burthens of the nation were always much inferior to those, which all the other countries of Europe supported, without exception : they were contributed without murmuring, because every one saw that they were usefully employed.

The clemency and generosity of the king, his affability and his popularity, have enchanted and captivated the Neapolitans.

From the first moment of his reign, he never would believe in plots, or conspiracies against his person ; and there is no example, of his having shed one single drop of blood, for pretended treasons.

He is not less an enemy to punishment, than he is eager to reward. Those even who solicit his liberality, without having any claims to it from services, rarely solicit it in vain.

Accessible to all his subjects, he is often seen amongst them, like a father in the midst of his children, distributing favours and reaping benedictions.

These are the means by which king Joachim has been able to inspire the Neapolitans with those active and durable sentiments, which constitute the glory, as well as the happiness and

safeguard, of kings; and which render a people capable of the most heroic devotion. We might add, that these dispositions have acquired greater strength, perhaps, by a parallel very easy to make.

The loyalty of the new administration, the fidelity with which its engagements have been fulfilled, have been compared with the violation of the public deposits, under the ancient government, in carrying off a hundred millions confided by individuals to the banks of Naples. The valour and military genius of Joachim have been compared with the double flight of Ferdinand, when the armies of the enemy scarcely touched the frontier. The mildness and clemency of the one have been compared with the atrocious acts of vengeance, which, at an epoch but too famous, put in mourning the kingdom and all Italy: but we wish not to awaken the memory of these cruel events. To prove what are the sentiments of the Neapolitan people for the king, and those of the king for the people, suffice it to say, that this prince has visited, successively, the greatest part of the provinces, at different periods, and under various events. Almost always without guards, in each town, in each village, he traversed, often on foot, an im-

mense croud, listening to the wretched and hearing their complaints ; and never finding himself wearied, whenever it was to do good, by granting a favour or an act of justice.

And it is this prince, against whom his subjects are invoked ! Well, let them answer us ! Did this prince, when he was thus in the midst of his people, find a single enemy ? Was there not heard, every where, the expressions of attachment and of gratitude ? We should be afraid of being accused of flattery, in having exposed the facts just cited, if we could not invoke, from one end of Europe to the other, the testimony of every traveller, who has visited Naples, and has been a witness to the facts, or who has heard others speak of them. We do not fear, that any one can convict us of falsehood.

Cease, then, to calumniate a nation, which cherishes its sovereign, and which will not fail to give, when necessary, one of those striking examples of fidelity and devotion, which immortalises nations.

The sovereigns of Europe cannot be ignorant of the dispositions of the Neapolitans. Their ministers, their consuls, travellers, the voice of fame, may have informed them ; they will be glad to find the sentiments of a respectable nation in

harmony with their own sentiments, and with their engagements towards the king of Naples. Happy, then, must now be the Neapolitan nation! Her king has no longer need of military glory. As soon as he sees the peace of his kingdom assured, he will no longer judge it necessary to maintain a numerous army, which prudence now commands him to keep on foot.

Then may he give himself up to all his generous and beneficent feelings; bring his government to perfection; create liberal institutions; lessen the weight of taxes, which he has already diminished, since the war has ceased; cause agriculture, commerce, and the arts, to flourish; in a word, spread over the beautiful country that he governs, all the prosperity, all the felicity, which nature intended to bestow on it; and of which the miseries of ages have, for so long a time, ravished the brilliant inheritance.

THE END.

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